

THE REPORT OF THE 2019 BYLAWS COMMITTEE

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Proposition 1

DPCA Electronic Voting Weight Allocation and Process

If passed, this amendment would:

1. *Clarify the Charter so that DPCA annual general meetings explicitly include deliberative participation by electronic means, (such as video-conference participation via WebEx);*
2. *Removes Section 3.8, an archaic provision which allows for a DPCA vote to be called by the International Chair in a manner which is non-deliberative and disproportional to DA membership.*
3. *Removes reference to Section 3.8 in Section 3.9.*

RECOMMENDATION: ADOPT (Unanimous)

This amendment seeks to emphasize the right of DPCA members to participate in meetings by electronic means with their votes intact, and would delete Section 3.8, which provides for holding an emergency vote without calling a meeting and without notice while using reduced voting weights for country committee representation.

Whatever the justifications in the past, Section 3.8 now appears unnecessary, given improvements in (and the DPCA's familiarity with) the use of a variety of telecommunication means for meaningful participate in deliberations and voting.

Section 3.8 is archaic and undemocratic. It is non-deliberative and thus contrary to the spirit of Robert's Rules, and calls for voting that is disproportional to DA Membership. If invoked, votes are reduced from the current figure of over 200 down to 68; it guts and undermines 1P1V; it significantly increases the voting power of DPCA Officers and DNC members at the expense of country committees, and does not provide for means for debate. The mechanism can even be used to amend Bylaws — as long as the amendment was “discussed” at a previous meeting.

There is a question that has been raised by the Resolutions Committee which appears to sometimes invoke Section 3.8 in order to vote on Resolutions. This should be discussed, and a remedy sought, but we believe the potential harms of leaving Section 3.8 in the Charter are greater than any potential benefits, and so we support adoption of Prop 1.

Proposition 2

DPCA Representation of Non-Country Committee DA Members

If passed, this amendment would establish three non-Country Committee DPCA voting members (one per region) to be elected by, represent, and speak for Democrats Abroad Members living in countries without DPCA representatives.

RECOMMENDATION: REFER TO COMMITTEE (Unanimous)

As detailed in the 2018 SBC report, the 2019 Bylaws Committee agrees with the principle behind this proposal, but raised certain concerns surrounding the following issues:

1. The logistics for meaningful engagement of non-Country Committee members in holding elections for Non-Country Committee Voting Representatives;
2. The duties, responsibilities and privileges associated with such a position vis-a-vis those of RVCs; and
3. The discretion afforded to the respective Regional Vice Chairs to determine how (or whether) to elect such representatives in their respective regions.

In addition, this proposal would affect voting allocations, an issues that is currently in front of the Special Purpose Committee. The Bylaws Committee believes that this issue is best placed in the hands of a similar committee to evaluate the full impact of enacting this measure in conjunction with other proposals that affect voting allocation.

The 2019 Bylaws Committee therefore recommends referring this proposal to a Global Committee to be determined, (similar in scope as the 1P1V Special Purpose Committee,) which would consider the proposal in light of these issues.

Proposition 3

Establish Standing Committees

Proposition 3 was withdrawn by the author.

Proposition 4

Country Committee AGM by March 31

Proposition 4 was withdrawn by the author.

Proposition 5

May DPCA AGM; in DC in Odd Years

If passed, this amendment would fix the Global Meeting month to May in all years and the Global Meeting location in Washington, DC in odd years.

RECOMMENDATION: OPPOSE (Unanimous)

The 2019 Bylaws Committee's recommendations mirror those of the 2018 SBC.

The 2019 Bylaws Committee does not recommend the proposal of requiring the DPCA Global Meeting to be held in May. It was noted that certain venues may only be available at certain times, and a certain level of flexibility was desirable from an organizing perspective (while noting that the Global Meeting is traditionally held in Spring). Additionally, in Presidential election years, the timing of the Global Convention (which is typically held in conjunction with the Global Meeting) is dictated in part by the timing of the Global Presidential Primary, which could be held as late as June.

On the question of whether to stipulate that the Global Meeting being held in Washington, DC in odd-numbered years, the Bylaws Committee did not adopt a formal recommendation. This has already been supported by the body via a resolution, and there does not seem to be a clear benefit to encoding this in the Charter.

This amendment introduces an additional affect which, while appearing to intend "odd years only" in DC, effectively establishes the default meeting venue as DC every year — this would happen if the Chair fails to propose a meeting venue that is accepted by a majority of votes, as stipulated by this amendment proposition.

While some may present arguments for holding the meeting in DC every year, we think this should be a conscious decision by the DPCA, not a "default" effect should the Chair or other CC voting members fail to come to an agreement on a non-DC venue. Moreover we echo concerns that have been raised in the past on what effect such a default would have on favoring those in geographies for whom this will be more convenient, and disfavoring those living in geographies for whom this will be less convenient, to the detriment of the organization. As such the Bylaws Committee opposes this amendment proposition.

However, the following pros and cons of holding the Global Meeting in DC were noted for the DPCA's consideration:

Pros:

1. The fundamental business of Democrats Abroad is centered in DC;
2. Wide variety of guest speakers;
3. Opportunities for door-knocking, activism training and coordination with the DNC;

4. “Neutral” location to mitigate the regional bias within the organization;
5. Consistency in terms of cost and predictability in organizing logistics (particularly if we were become accustomed to holding it in the same location);
6. Turn-out for meetings held in DC is generally high (and consistent);
7. Higher visibility with national Democratic Party groups;
8. Variety of venues convenient to airports; and
9. Any member of Democrats Abroad can attend the Global Meetings, including at DC meetings where door knocks etc. take place.

Cons:

1. The membership base of Democrats Abroad is not centered in DC nor are they necessarily motivated by DC as a geographic location;
2. We already have elected officials and others who represent our interests in DC and at the DNC regularly — the International ExCom, DNC Reps, and those working on committees such as Taxation;
3. The DPCA already voted to set the venue to DC every two years at the Berlin Global Meeting by resolution;
4. Previously, the DPCA had voted to rotate the locations of the Global Meetings in order to better and more fairly distribute the burden and cost of travel and the benefits of visibility, voice and representation;
5. Setting the default Global Meeting location to DC in the event there are not enough votes to agree on a location outside of DC is the same as voting to permanently favor some geographies over others and disfavoring some geographies over others;
6. No “host committee” in DC since by definition no DA or DPCA members live there; and
7. More significant organizing logistics than relying on Country Committees to plan and host.

Proposition 6A

Voting Representative Gender Statistical Differences

Proposition 6A was withdrawn by the author.

Proposition 6B

Voting Representative Gender Based Diversity

Proposition 6B was withdrawn by the author.

Proposition 6C

Voting Representative Gender Parity is minimum 50% Non-Male

If passed, this amendment would change the Charter's gender balance requirement to not more than 50% male, instead of requiring equal division between men and women.

RECOMMENDATION: OPPOSE (Unanimous)

Despite the issues with the way the DA gender balance requirement is currently written, the 2019 Bylaws Committee does not recommend adopting this amendment. Many members have expressed concern with the way that the Charter requires gender balance even when Country Committees have indicated that they are turning away qualified women volunteers for Voting Representative because it would be in violation of gender balance rules.

Applied to the modern and particular context of Democrats Abroad, this stipulation from the DNC does not always accomplish what it was intended to do, even if it may still be relevant for other state parties. While acknowledging this problem as a serious one, the 2019 Bylaws Committee feels that this proposal creates a risk that the DNC would find Democrats Abroad out of compliance, and therefore cannot recommend the proposal.

There are also other remedies to such gender-balance challenges, which are brought about due to the recent implementation of 1P1V and the election of so many new Voting Reps. NEC processes, proactive recruitment practices, educating of members, and making adjustments to how elections are designed and planned for can provide a better and more immediate result of increasing diversity of your DPCA members and representation, not just along gender lines. It is also noted that the gender balance or equal division rule of the DNC and DA are not new policies — they have been there. What has changed now is that the DPCA, with 1P1V, is forced to elect more people to carry votes.

The gender balance requirement is a stipulation that is consistently applied by the DNC to all state parties, and also is one that Democrats Abroad is required to follow. The 2019 Bylaws Committee believes there are more effective channels to pursue a solution to this problem than a change to DA's bylaws that risks bringing the organization out of compliance with DNC rules.

A resolution may also be an effective way to draw attention to this issue, or leadership from the ExCom could broach the unintended consequences of the provision through conversations with DNC leadership. Both could be more appropriate channels to address this issue.

Proposition 7

Removal of Country Committees & Creation of a “Fresh Start” Option

If passed, this amendment would have the primary effect of removing Country Committees that are deemed out of compliance for three years, rather than the current four years. Other provisions are currently in effect under the purview of the International ExCom since 2017/2018; this amendment would have no impact on these points.

RECOMMENDATION: OPPOSE (Unanimous)

The Bylaws Committee raised a number of concerns focused on the primary effect of this proposal - to change the amount of time needed to sunset out of compliance Country Committees from four years (current) to three years (proposed).

Concerns:

1. That three years out-of-compliance may be too short a period; four years may be better; it is unclear what benefit being more restrictive and shortening from four years to three years brings, or why this is best encoded in Bylaws.
2. Current practice under ExCom governance policy of four years ensures oversight and assessment by at least two terms of an RVC (and possibility of a new RVC);
3. Four years also ensures that a Country Committee enjoys the organizing energy and benefits of at least one Presidential election cycle. The Bylaws Committee agreed that it is important for Country Committees to have an opportunity to hold events and that attract new leadership, volunteers, talent, and resources to revitalize the local Country Committee.

The Bylaws Committee also felt that questions of timing and other adjustments to policy mechanisms related to Country Committee removal may be better left to the International ExCom and RVCs as part of their governance purview, rather than locking in hard limits and hard removals for Country Committees via Charter changes.

Absent a compelling and urgent need to change policy, the Bylaws Committee believes it prudent to observe the effects of current policy before entertaining further changes, and to prioritize using other mechanisms that exist to adjust policy.

Proposition 8

Extend Voting Time

If passed, this amendment would delay voting on motions made during DPCA meetings for one hour, and subsequently hold the vote open for six hours.

RECOMMENDATION: OPPOSE (Unanimous)

From the 2018 SBC: The SBC sympathizes with the issues faced by members attending DPCA Global Meetings remotely, often in time zones that do not correspond to ordinary waking hours. However, Robert's Rules of Order and effective deliberation are premised on the principle of participating in debate prior to casting votes, so it seems important for voters to be online for the period of time leading up to the vote. Furthermore, the DPCA's proxy system facilitates voting by members unable to attend meetings for whatever reason. The SBC therefore does not recommend adoption of this proposal.

From the 2019 Bylaws Committee: The 2019 Bylaws Committee re-considered the proposition this year, but ultimately reached the same conclusion. The 2019 Bylaws Committee members have the same concerns as the 2018 SBC.

Pros:

1. Seemingly would allow people to vote remotely in a way that accommodates our span across time zones.
2. Could make meetings more efficient by eliminating voting from the meetings.

Cons:

1. This would make meetings difficult to run as a deliberative body with discussion followed by voting because voting would be left open many hours and would prolong the meeting.
2. Members would not be able to consider impact of a measure's passage/failure when voting on related measures.

Suggestions: Because of the burden of staying up through the night on people who cannot attend meetings in person, Democrats Abroad should explore ways to use technology and RRO to facilitate participation that reflects the practical challenges to attendance. For example, Democrats Abroad could consider implementing electronic voting outside of meetings by motion to postpone to a date certain or otherwise scheduling deliberations and electronic voting outside of the meetings when appropriate.

Proposition 9

Change Titles from “International” to “Global”

If passed, this amendment would amend the Charter to refer to DPCA officers as “Global” rather than “International.”

RECOMMENDATION: OPPOSE (Unanimous)

The proposal seems reasonable on its face. But “international” in this context distinguishes between members of the Democratic party outside the U.S. as compared with those within the U.S.; “Global” typically refers to the totality of an organization, that is, inclusive of all countries, including the U.S.

Moreover, to our ears, the current usage of “International Chair” is more euphonic — it sounds better. Often, the choice of usage depends in the end on how a term sounds to us. Just as “Global Primary” sounds (arguably) better than “International Primary” — despite the inconsistency evident above — “International Chair” seems more appealing than “Global Chair.”

It also appears that such linguistic distinctions using one term or the other have evolved in practice over time by the organization: it appears that we speak of “Global Meetings”, “Global Caucuses” and “Global Primary” which (intentionally or not) suggest activities to which all DA members are welcome and may participate. We speak of the “International” Executive Committee, which signal a more selective set of individuals with more specific rather than general purpose. DA appears as a culture to refer to individual roles as “International” (Counsel, Secretary, Chair, etc), and to all-call meetings or bodies as “Global”.

Such judgments are subjective, to be sure, but when over time a certain usage becomes generally accepted, there is a strong indication that, for whatever reason, that usage may have reason to be preferred.

As one Bylaws Committee member commented, “International” may be more precise, (compared to a “National” Country Committee Chair or Officer), may be easier to explain, and may be more likely to be clearly and accurately communicated to and by the press.

It is also felt that such a language change in the culture of DA may be better led by other functions, such as Communications, guidance from the ExCom, or Resolutions, rather than be driven from the Charter. No case has been made for regulatory concern or potential harm, just a desire to make language more consistent. We do not feel this is sufficient and so oppose.

Proposition 10

Remove Term Limits for Voting Reps

If adopted, this amendment would clarify in the Charter that DPCA voting representatives do not have limits on the total number of terms that they can serve.

RECOMMENDATION: ADOPT (Unanimous)

The 2019 Bylaws Committee appreciates the clarification that this proposition offers by adding language to make the Charter clear that: (i) DPCA Voting Representatives must be elected nationally and (ii) DPCA Voting Representatives do not have term limits.

The 2019 Bylaws Committee concluded that the clarification on term limits is sensible, and further that term limits on DPCA Voting Representatives are not necessary. Allowing DPCA Voting Representatives to serve until Country Committee members choose not to elect them allows them to build expertise and experience and rely on that to serve their committees. The 2019 Bylaws Committee noted that Country Committees may have difficulty finding new volunteers to serve as DPCA Voting Representatives if term limits were to apply. Accordingly, the 2019 Bylaws Committee recommends adopting this proposal and allowing the electoral process to determine who should serve as DPCA Voting Representatives and for how long.

Proposition 11

Direct Election of Global DA Chair

If passed, this amendment would change the process for the election of International Chair to a global, member-wide election, held every four years in conjunction with the Global Presidential Primary.

RECOMMENDATION: OPPOSE (Unanimous)

While the 2019 Bylaws Committee appreciates the drafter's intent to encourage a broader-based participation in the election of the International Chair, Committee members expressed a number of concerns about the proposed approach.

Concerns:

1. **Timing:** Under the proposed approach, it is conceivable that the organization elects a Chair with no or little experience into the role mere months before the US general election, particularly if the Global Presidential Primary is held later in the primary season, leaving little time for the newly-elected Chair to establish himself/herself within the organization and the DNC in advance of the general election.
2. **Poorly-informed electorate:** The Global Presidential Primary is a period of tremendous growth of our organization, as new members join, sometimes minutes before casting a primary vote, in order to participate in the GPP. These are individuals who will have no information on candidates for International Chair prior to casting a vote. Additionally, those existing members who participate in the GPP who are fully engaged in the primary and feel passionately about their preferred candidates may put no or little effort into learning about the candidates for International Chair.
3. **Global politicking:** There is a real risk that the election for International Chair would serve as a proxy race for the presidential primary, with members voting not on the qualifications of a candidate but for who that candidate supports. The real or perceived abandonment of Democrats Abroad's neutrality prior to the official nomination of a candidate risks our organization's standing.
4. **Lack of organizational familiarity:** A severe lack of understanding about the work of DPCA may hinder informed choices both among electors and candidates. The committee notes that many members of Democrats Abroad may be entirely unaware of the work and responsibilities of the various offices within DPCA and of the operating procedures required to run the organization well. And, unlike in a Presidential election, there are not extensive resources for coordinating a transition or a cadre of civil servants to ensure continuity. The potential damage to DPCA's efficacy is, in the committee's opinion, debilitating.
5. **Logistics:** There are fundamental challenges when campaigning to a global electorate of more than 140,000 across nearly every country in the world. While a direct election would encourage candidates to make an effort to reach every member of Democrats

Abroad, this would be a commitment that requires money, resources, and infrastructure that do not exist in our all-volunteer organization.

6. **Precedent:** Many organizations with similar geographical scope or political purpose operate elections in a similar manner to current DPCA methods. Rotary International, for example, is a global organization that appoints delegates to elect its international executive. Additionally, the committee is unaware of any state parties that directly elect chairs.

Proposition 12

Require Country Committee Absentee Voting

If passed, this amendment would codify in the DPCA Charter a requirement that Country Committees make absentee voting available to members when voting on Country Committee business matters, including the election of Country Committee officers.

RECOMMENDATION: OPPOSE (Unanimous)

The 2019 Bylaws Committee believes that the proposed Charter amendment takes too heavy-handed an approach to address problem that is vague at best.

Democrats Abroad currently has a clear set of election guidelines detailed in the Country Committee Election Procedures which already include the option to implement voting by absentee ballot where conditions for Country Committees support that choice decision, at their option. What this amendment does in fact is require that Country Committees conduct elections via absentee voting.

The autonomy of Country Committees on deciding their own conduct of elections, while in keeping with DPCA principles and with a community of guidance and support, is important to recognize and maintain from within the Charter. Democrats Abroad has Country Committees in a wide variety of environments, some of which make postal ballots and/or internet connectivity a massive challenge. Country Committee leaders know their local realities best and must have the freedom to craft election procedures best-suited for the Country Committee. Additional significant concerns include the automatic inability to take nominations from the floor at an Annual General Meeting in which elections allow for an early vote or absentee voting component. All of these kinds of considerations should continue be taken into account locally as it is done now; this amendment would be interfere locally while not solving any known issue for the DPCA.

Moreover, there are risks that come from overly dictating or overly prescribing via the DPCA Charter how Country Committees should conduct their affairs, including overly specifying the conduct of elections.

Finally, Federal Election Commission (FEC) legal questions can arise from blurring the line between the DPCA governance and Country Committee governance. Currently, Country Committees are not required to follow FEC rules and guidelines, but DPCA is required to file. The Bylaws Committee noted that the requirement that Country Committee's maintain a demonstrable amount of autonomy from the DPCA has been a concern of both past and present International Legal Counsels. From the viewpoint of most individual Country Committees, the added burden of FEC compliance would be thoroughly destructive on their ability to operate. A risk of this magnitude could only be justified if it resolves a compelling harm, which this proposition does not do.

Proposition 13

Require Quorum Definition in Country Committee Charters

If passed, this amendment would codify in the DPCA Charter a requirement that Country Committees bylaws stipulate quorum requirements for Country Committee business.

RECOMMENDATION: OPPOSE (Unanimous)

While the 2019 Bylaws Committee generally supports the inclusion of quorum requirements for Country Committee business, there is already a mechanism by which this can be achieved which negates the need to codify the requirement in the DPCA Charter.

For those Country Committees of concern, the International Counsel working with RVCs can instruct the Country Committee to amend the local bylaws to incorporate quorum requirements that are reasonable and relevant to their needs. Additionally, there are existing templates (Model Country Committee Bylaws) that set forth clear expectations, including quorum, that Country Committees should reference.

Finally, Federal Election Commission (FEC) legal questions can arise from blurring the line between the DPCA governance and Country Committee governance. Currently, Country Committees are not required to follow FEC rules and guidelines, but DPCA is required to file. The Bylaws Committee noted that the requirement that Country Committee's maintain a demonstrable amount of autonomy from the DPCA has been a concern of both past and present International Legal Counsels. From the viewpoint of most individual Country Committees, the added burden of FEC compliance would be thoroughly destructive on their ability to operate. A risk of this magnitude could only be justified if it resolves a compelling harm, which this proposition does not do.

Proposition 14

Allow Appointment of Country Committee Chapter Chairs

If adopted, this amendment would change the DPCA Charter to explicitly allow Country Committee Chairs to appoint Chapter Chairs.

RECOMMENDATION: OPPOSE (Unanimous)

One of the functions of Section 5.6 of the DPCA Charter (Chapters) is to describe a democratic principle that Chapter leadership be elected. It provides guidance for election of chapter chairs that mirrors the process for electing Country Committee chairs.

Country Committees differ widely in how they view, use, and organize chapters or other subdivisions — indeed whether to have them or not. In addition, Section 5.6 of the current Charter also provides that if a Country Committee decides to have chapters those "chapters shall be recognized only for internal purposes of the Country Committee upon terms to be specified by the Country Committee."

How a Country Committee decides to implement chapters or election of chapter leadership is appropriately under purview of the individual Country Committees. Absent any demonstrable harm to the DPCA, the Bylaws Committee opposes this amendment.

Proposition 15

Charter Review

If passed, this amendment would:

- 1. Move oversight of Charter revision to International Legal Counsel (rather than International Secretary);*
- 2. Describe a condition of support from the Bylaws Committee (or other relevant committees familiar with bylaws amendments proposed and adopted); and*
- 3. Give deadlines for reviewing, certifying, and publication/distribution of a Charter revision — 30 days from passage to submit to Legal Counsel; 15 days to review and certify a Charter revision draft, and publish and distribute.*

Additionally, this amendment would:

- 4. Strike Schedule A from the Charter; and*
- 5. Strike (not amend) reference to Schedule A from the Charter*

RECOMMENDATION: ADOPT (Unanimous)

In recent months, it was observed that the text of the Democrats Abroad Charter contained some inaccuracies, and did not fully reflect changes made to it by the body on matters such as vote allocation, DPCA officer qualifications, and the status of out-of-compliance Country Committees.

Moreover, the problem did not appear to be limited to a single set of revisions or single version of the Charter. The 2019 Charter Review Committee was tasked specifically with reviewing past Charter versions against the amendments passed by the DPCA at several past Global Meetings, focusing mostly on 2011-2018, but also going back as far as 2007, and to propose corrections conforming its text to what had been adopted by the Democratic Party Committee Abroad (DPCA).

A key recommendation of the CRC Report is to amend the Bylaws so that responsibility for updating and distributing Charter revisions is moved to the oversight of the International Legal Counsel, rather than the International Secretary, and the spelling out of reasonable timelines and describing some support conditions to make that sustainable. It is evident that this is not a question of a single person or point of failure but that our current practice invites error and inconsistency in the handling of a key document of the DPCA. The Bylaws Committee supports this amendment because it provides clear and reasonable guidance, including assigning responsibility and establishing timelines for delivering an updated Charter revision to the body. We consider it appropriate for the Charter to spell out requirements for its proper revision and dissemination; especially in light of the persistence of the problem over several years.

STRIKING SCHEDULE A

Additionally, the 2019 Charter Review Committee also recommend the Charter by changed so that Schedule A is struck, as it is in conflict with the passage of Prop 4: 1P1V — it is impossible to implement both 1P1V and Schedule A at the same time. (Note: At the time of the passage of 2018's 1P1V Charter amendment, Schedule A was missing from the then-current Charter version, and so was overlooked by amendment authors as well as the 2018 SBC.)

Moreover there is a question as to whether Schedule A still belongs in the Charter: Schedule A illustrates how voting allocation of Country Committees is done in a step by step chart. While it there is utility to seeing an example or step-by-step reference on voting allocation, and historically this document may have been necessary for a body moving to a more complex voting allocation system, it is felt that the Charter text should be reliable to describe voting allocation and method; that this should not be left to a Schedule or what has become in effect an illustrative example dictate. The CRC suggests that such an illustrative document is helpful but can and should be maintained for DPCA reference outside the Charter itself. The Bylaws Committee finds this suggestion reasonable.

STRIKE OR AMEND TEXT?

Concerns: The CRC recommended in its report that an amendment to strike Schedule A and to strike *or amend* reference to Schedule A is advised. This amendment proposition strikes Schedule A and strikes reference to it from the Charter, but does not offer amendment language to the Charter text that would preserve one significant effect of Schedule A: the Schedule describes voting allocation as being based on DPCA Country Committee performance (the share of verified membership) *relative to other DPCA Country Committees, only* — not relative to total Democrats Abroad membership globally.

However, the current text of Section 3.6 (a)(iii) says

3.6 (a)(iii) ...”by the Country Committee’s percentage **of the total Democrats Abroad membership.**”

(Emphasis added.) This text has not changed since 2011 since it was first introduced.

There are some 5,000 DA members currently who live in such non-Country Committee areas and there are two propositions currently before the Bylaws Committee which ask whether such members are overlooked and under-represented by the DPCA. Schedule A quite literally says that these non-Country Committee members do not count as a part of our global performance and voting allocation calculations. While it may have been the case in 2011 that only those living in country committees could be meaningfully compared to, is this still the case today?

It may then be worth consideration by the DPCA as to whether this is a desirable effect of Schedule A, and therefore the Charter text should be further amended to keep the effect; or whether this is an insignificant or undesirable effect of Schedule A, and reference to Schedule A simply struck, leaving Section 3.6 (a)(iii) as currently written.

To preserve the effect of Schedule A in calculating voting allocation based on country committee

membership only, the following language is proposed by Will Bakker (RVC EMEA); this language is not currently reflected in the mendment as presented:

- 3.6 (a)(iii) ...“by the Country Committee’s percentage of the total membership of all admitted Country Committees in Democrats Abroad”

Proposition 16

Full and Fair Implementation of 1P1V

If passed, this amendment would:

- 1. Ensure that each Country Committee Chair and Vice Chair receive one whole vote as with other DPCA Members;*
- 2. Preserves this “base vote” as separate and inviolate from other calculations as the DPCA may apply with respect to voting allocation done on a proportional (share of membership) basis*

DIVIDED REPORT

POINT: There was extensive discussion of this proposal. There was support for it, and there were those who suggested that it be considered as part of an overall evaluation of vote allocation in the future rather than dealt with separately at this time.

It was also suggested that, while it seems churlish to oppose this measure, as part of implementation of “1P1V,” it should be recognized by all that the result would be a further diminution of the proportionality of our vote allocation.

The current system of allocation is skewed in favor of smaller committees. For example, the five largest committees have 49% of DA cc membership but cast 39% of the VR vote. This proposal will add 10 votes to the smallest committees. The result will be that the five largest committees, with 49% of the membership, will cast 37% of the VR vote, a further erosion of 2%, which in and of itself does not seem problematic were it not for the substantial deviation from proportionality that already exists.

Consider further, currently each Voting Representative vote for the ten smallest currently represents, on average, 185 members, while each VR vote in the two largest committees represent 690 members. Implementation of this proposal will mean that each Voting Representative vote from the ten smallest committees will represent 92 members, while each Voting Representative vote of the two largest committees will still represent 690 members.

The ten smallest committees, under this proposal, with 1.6% of the members of DA, would cast 9.2% of the total DPCA Country Committee votes.

Although the principle of proportional representation (based on Democratic performance) is fundamental to the requirements of state parties by the DNC, there has always been a recognition that there will be a discrepancy between exceptionally large units and exceptionally small units in state parties.

That is not a real problem in most instances. In DA, however, our challenge has been how best to approach proportionality (based on Democratic performance), when there

are so very many small country committees, each one of which holds a number of votes greater than its membership would justify.

However one judges the merit of this proposal and whether now is the time to make this change, we should all recognize that it represents a further erosion of the principle of proportionality.

COUNTERPOINT: It is also noted that for several decades until 2011, despite having long been considered a Democratic State Party, Democrats Abroad allocated votes to its country committees in an extremely unproportional way, on a ratio of 4:1 from largest to smallest country committees, with only very coarse reference pegging the numbers of votes to the size of the membership of country committees. What changed? The Obama wave of 2007 and 2008, and Democrats Abroad launching its Global Primary, captured US voter enthusiasm and activism around the world, and the organization grew dramatically as a result, with a proliferation of small and medium-sized country committee growth, as well as a sharp increase in membership numbers of large committees.

This is not to argue that we should return to a system which was unproportional to an extreme — it is simply to say that extreme disproportionality was well-tolerated by this organization and, apparently, by the DNC, until quite recently, and that the question of voting allocation is a fair topic to revisit as this organization continues to grow and evolve, and that asking such questions is not out of disregard for democratic principles of which proportionality is but one. In 2011, a major overhaul of the voting allocation system went into effect that first introduced now-familiar arguments for “strict proportionality”, including extreme effects that would have permitted very large country committees to hold a concentrated number of votes in a small number of DPCA member hands — a single member of the DPCA at one point in the debate, could have in theory, held 20 times (or more) the number of votes as another member of the DPCA. Since then the DPCA has continued to adjust its voting allocation system and other related mechanisms — 2018’s passage of One Person, One Vote finally meant that a single DPCA voter could not hold more than one vote intrinsically than another. It is fair and right of DPCA members to ask that proportionality concerns be considered alongside and in balance with other *equally legitimate* concerns: how does the body wish to fairly recognize its fellow members, their voices, their votes, their efforts, their diversity, their representation, to the benefit of our common purpose, and how we can best organize? In short, while proportionality is an important principle, it surely is not the only important principle the DPCA should take into consideration.

It is worth noting here that Prop 16 does not affect voting allocation questions or proposals under consideration elsewhere. Regardless of other voting allocation debates, Prop 16’s only effect is to restore what has effectively been in place until 2015 — one whole vote each for a Country Committee Chair and Vice Chair. This changed with the Punta Cana Charter Revision 2015, based on a request by the DNC to round fractions up from .455. Prior to Punta Cana, the DA Charter allowed for any fraction of membership to be rounded up to one whole vote. Amendment supporters argue that DNC instructions were not demanding “more proportionality”, that they were not demanding that the DPCA reduce the voice and votes of our equivalent of state party county chairs and vice chairs — it was a comment on math. The full effects of this

change did not become apparent until earlier this year, when 10 country committees whose Chairs and Vice Chairs had previously held one whole vote each were reduced to a half-vote each, as this voting share was re-allocated to larger committees.

It is a genuine and fair question to ask whether this is a good and desirable effect for the organization, no matter how proportional a rationale can be made on paper.

The solution proposed by Prop 16 is simple: give whole DPCA Votes to Chairs and Vice Chairs, period. They are to be given whole votes in the same manner that whole votes are given to our DNC reps or to members of our International ExCom. It eliminates the possibility that one country's Voting Representative has a greater voting weight than a Country Committee Chair or Vice Chair, who cannot be presumed to be doing less for DA, less for their Country Committee, less for their members, or to have less work or commitment to our common cause than any other member of the DPCA.

This amendment does not affect the larger voting allocation discussion or questions currently under discussion. It is limited in its effects, and does not preclude other decisions the DPCA may take with respect to voting allocation and related questions.

Proposition 17

Change the System by which Democrats Abroad Allocates Votes to Country Committees and to Other DA Leaders

NO RECOMMENDATION

In 2018, the Standing Bylaws Committee recommended and the DPCA referred the substance of this Proposition to the 1P1V Special Purpose Committee for additional review. The 2019 Bylaws Committee declines to issue an opinion on this proposition until that process has concluded and a set of recommendations are available.

Proposition 18

Limit 1 Proxy; Loosen to Whom Voter May Proxy To

NO RECOMMENDATION

In 2018, the Standing Bylaws Committee recommended and the DPCA referred the substance of this Proposition to the 1P1V Special Purpose Committee for additional review. The 2019 Bylaws Committee declines to issue an opinion on this proposition until that process has concluded and a set of recommendations are available.

Proposition 19

Expressly Allow for the Election of Non-Voting and Alternate Voting Representatives

RECOMMENDATION: ADOPT (Unanimous)

If passed, Prop 19 would:

- 1. Amend the charter to clarify that the election of Alternate Voting Representatives is expressly allowed;*
- 2. Designate Alternate Voting Representatives as members of the DPCA, with the exception that they are Non-Voting positions;*
- 3. Make clear that Alternate Voting Representatives, as the name implies, may fill vacancies among Country Committee Voting Representatives as may arise, in keeping with gender balance/equal division rules. Note that Alternate Voting Representatives carry proxies normally as other members of the DPCA.*
- 4. Reinstate "Non-Voting Representatives" to allow for their election by smaller country committees for whom the election of Voting Reps and Alternates are not yet an option.*

It is evident from both the Bylaws Committee Public Hearings as well as the 1P1V Special Purpose Committee Report and Public Hearings to date that the mechanism of Alternate Voting Representative is an important one for Country Committees seeking smooth implementation of 1P1V and stability of their representation in matters of the DPCA.

If left unamended, it is felt that the Charter as written is insufficiently clear, and as such has led to and will continue to lead to confusion and under-utilization of Alternate Voting Representatives as an important mechanism, but one which must be planned for at the same time that national election of officers and Voting Representatives takes place. This clarification in the Charter is also sought now with some urgency as Country Committees are in the process of undertaking to amend their own Country Committee Bylaws, candidate recruitment and election practices, to more optimally implement 1P1V.

Additionally, this section provides an opportunity to reinstate the position and election of "Non-Voting Representatives" as Non-Voting Members of the DPCA, which was removed in a revision by the 2018 SBC primarily concerned about other aspects of the affected text at the time. While this was not a widely used mechanism, it had existed in the Charter since 2011, and we received feedback during the public hearings that in particular some smaller country committees that may not have sufficient numbers to elect Voting Representatives still viewed their ability to elect a Non-Voting DPCA Representative as an important contribution to the DPCA and to their representation, and that its removal has led to consequences unintended by the 2018 SBC. Reinstating this position here would have this positive impact, and no other significant impact that we are aware.

Proposition 20

DPCA Removal of DPCA Members; CCs Must Remove from CC Office

RECOMMENDATION: ADOPT (Unanimous)

If passed, Prop 20 would:

- 1. Clarify that while the DPCA can remove members of the DPCA from its body — with cause, and pursuant to other conditions, as described in Section 2.4 — such removal does not have the force of removing them from local Country Committees;*
- 2. Ensure that during proceedings concerning the removal of a member of the DPCA, the affected local Country Committee is notified such that they may take steps necessary to remedy concerns, including taking further action to remove said members from Country Committee elected positions, consistent with local Country Committee Bylaws, as they deem appropriate.*

This charter amendment proposes to clarify that, while the DPCA can take action to remove a Country Committee Chair, Vice Chair or Voting Representative from the DPCA as may need be, it is up to the local Country Committee to take additional and appropriate action to remove them from Country Committee office.

The Bylaws Committee agrees with the Amendment author that this delineation between the authority and responsibility of the DPCA to govern its members, and that of local Country Committees tasked with governing their local entities via their Bylaws, leadership mechanisms, and in keeping with local laws and country conditions, is important to maintain and emphasize within the Charter itself, and supports the passage of Prop 20 as written.